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The importance of organizational form in American medicine has been
the subject of much debate. But the character of the debate-the nonprofit
form versus its competitors-has been sufficiently confused that much of
the controversy should be reconsidered. That debate has been both ideo-
logical (commercialism and profit versus service and professionalism) and
practical (which form is more efficient)? The challenge of public policy is
to adapt public rules to the central realities of American medicine, not the
shibboleths of shrill discourse. In the case of medicine, factors other than
the form of legal ownership-among them, the nature of the service pro-
vided, the developmental stage of the service, the role of physicians in
providing the service, and the nature of government regulation-are more
important in fashioning those appropriate responses.
The radical transformation that has been occuring in American
medicine is not substantially explained by changes in organizational form.
What we are witnessing is a shift in the character of American
medicine-a rise of commercialism and a decline of a professional
ethos-that cuts across organizational forms. Ownership-based policies
alone cannot reverse this trend. A restoration of the fundamental values of
caring, historically associated with charitable nonprofit institutions but
endangered by growth and depersonalization of the medical industry, is
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essential. So, paradoxically, the central conclusion of a discussion of non-
profits in medicine is that the environment facing decision makers in med-
ical institutions and the conventions by which they operate are more sig-
nificant than what institutions call themselves on their legal charters.
This article aims to provide a more accurate and better balanced assess-
ment of the role of nonprofit organizations in health care. Part I
introduces the debate over the effect of various organizational forms in
health care and criticizes the failure of commentators to examine the sys-
tematic effects of organizational form on cost, quality, and accessibility of
American medical care. Part II examines the history of the nonprofit form
in American medicine and attempts to set that story in the broader history
of American medical care. Part III surveys empirical studies of the effects
of organizational form on health care cost, quality, and access. In Part IV
we address the policy implications of both the historical and contemporary
differences between for-profit and nonprofit organizations in health care
and present our recommendations for sensible policy responses. We con-
clude that flexible policies based on organizational form should be used to
exploit the limited but systematic differences between for-profit and non-
profit institutions, though we emphasize that the major problems facing
health care today cannot be alleviated by ownership-based policies alone.
I. The Debate over Organizational Forms in Health Care:
The Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality
The proper role of nonprofits in the health care industry and the
appropriate public policy toward nonprofit health care providers are sub-
jects mired in controversy. The history of this organizatonal form in
medicine-and the comparison of nonprofit with governmental and for-
profit health institutions'-is itself contentious, and the appraisal of
1. The for-profit health care provider usually takes on the familiar corporate form. In particular,
the company is owned by its stockholders and managed by a board of directors elected by the stock-
holders. Capital is raised through the sale of equity and the issuance of debt. Any net earnings are
distributed in the form of dividends to the stockholders or retained and reinvested by the corporation,
rendering the stock more valuable. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1980).
The nonprofit corporation, in comparison, does not issue equity. A nonprofit may accrue net earn-
ings, but no dividends are paid. Any net earnings must be retained by the corporation. (A commercial
nonprofit organization must make a profit to survive, especially in medical care. The distinction be-
tween nonprofit and for-profit enterprise rests largely on what is termed the nondistribution con-
straint, that is, profits cannot be distributed to individuals. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Non-
profit Organization in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (W. Powell ed.
forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization]. The
corporation is managed most often by a board of directors, either elected by the membership (which
can include either donors or beneficiaries) or self-perpetuating. Thus, unlike the for-profit corpora-
tion, there is no formal connection between an individual's financial interest in the venture and the
power to select and control management. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129
Vol. 3: 313, 1986
Nonprofits In Health Care
contemporary arrangements is marked by fundamental differences of
value, perspective, and fact.
A. The Controversy Portrayed: Nonprofits vs. For-Profits
The history of nonprofits in American medicine is quite variously por-
trayed. For hospitals, the nonprofit form is undoubtedly the dominant
legal organization today. For some interpreters, the history is one of evi-
dent triumph over the profit-making small hospital. For others, however,
the story describes either an endangered species reeling under the compe-
tition of large hospital chains, or a changing balance among forms of hos-
pitals in which the dominant theme is convergence, not differentiation. As
with hospitals, so with physicians. They are alternately regarded as
profit-making entrepreneurs cloaked in the misleading rhetoric of service
professionalism or technically expert professionals resisting the commer-
cial blandishments of corporate medicine.' These conflicting perspectives
shape the character, tone, and policy conclusions of much recent scholar-
ship about the history of American medicine.' Historical controversy spills
over into disputes about what is currently taking place in American
medicine. Change is everywhere reported,4  but its dimensions,
U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981).
Some, but not all, nonprofit corporations are charities under Section 501(c)(3) of the federal tax
law. I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (1985). The charity status is important because donations to charitable organi-
zations are tax deductible to the donor, thus conferring a significant federal subsidy upon nonprofit
charities that receive contributions. State and federal tax laws also define a category of nonprofits that
are exempt from corporate income, sales, and other taxes. See Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempt-
ing Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
Professor Hansmann describes differences among nonprofits based upon two characterstics: the
source of income and the form of management or control. The "donative nonprofit" relies primarily
on donation income, while the "commercial nonprofit" derives its income primarily from the sale of
goods or services to paying consumers. The "mutual nonprofit" is run by a board selected by the
donors or consumer members, while the "entrepreneurial nonprofit" is managed by a self-selected
board. The dominant form of nonprofit in the health care industry is the entrepreneurial/commercial
nonprofit. Nonprofit hospitals, although they qualify as charities, receive the great bulk of their
income from sale of services. This is particularly true of nursing homes, which are rarely the recipi-
ents of charitable donations of any significant size. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 838-43 (1980).
The third set of actors in health care are the public providers. Cities, counties, states, and the
federal government all operate hospital and health facilities of various kinds. The capital funds are tax
dollars, and the management is under the formal control of the sponsoring government.
2. See, e.g., Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963, 964,
967-68 (1980); Yordy, Current and Future Developments in Health Care, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 27, 32 (1986).
3. See, e.g., THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT (B. Gray ed. 1983); P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); R. EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE (1984).
4. See Goldsmith, Death of a Paradigm: The Challenge of Competition, 3 HEALTH AFF. 5
(1984); Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR
PROFIT 1 (B. Gray ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Gray, Introduction]; Gray, Overview: Origins and
Trends, 61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 7 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Gray, Overview].
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consequences, and meanings are bewildering. Although the proportion of
proprietary hospitals among all hospitals has not increased, within the
for-profit hospital sector the number of hospitals organized in investor-
owned chains has doubled between 1973 and 1982,' and for-profit firms
now own and manage hospitals that used to be publicly run, controlled by
nonprofit boards, or the preserve of physician owners.' Some nonprofit
hospitals imitate the new corporate form by forming themselves into large
systems.7 Furthermore, the merging of substantial health-related institu-
tions is not restricted to hospitals. Symptomatic of the vertical integration
taking place in health was the proposed 1985 merger of the for-profit
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) with American Hospital Supply
(AHS), a multi-billion dollar fusion of health giants (the largest in their
respective sectors) that dominated front pages of the nation's newspapers
for a few days in March, 1985.8
To complicate matters further, nonprofit hospitals themselves have
increasingly taken to the corporate marketplace, spawning for-profit sub-
sidiaries, seeking debt financing that differs from stocks and bonds in legal
name only, and searching for ways to imitate insurance companies, con-
sulting firms, and industrial park entrepreneurs.' Health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), home health agencies, dialysis and urgent care
centers, and other extra-hospital forms are increasingly managed under
proprietary auspices. All of this takes place in the full view of the national
media, delighted to repeat the passionate exchanges of defenders of vari-
ous faiths-markets, governments, and nonprofits.10 No wonder, then,
5. Gray, Overview, supra note 4, at 12.
6. Id., at 10-11; Gray, Introduction, supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. As of 1982, there were 34 investor-owned multi-hospital systems comprising 773 hospitals and
139 nonprofit systems comprising 967 hospitals (up from 121 nonprofit systems in 1978). Gray, Over-
view, supra note 4, at 13. This source offers a current review of the growth of nonprofit and proprie-
tary hospital systems and recent activity in institutions other than hospitals.
8. In the event, Baxter Travenol won the battle for AHS, outbidding HCA to produce a huge,
four billion dollar, horizontal conglomerate. Had HCA succeeded, the result would have been the
largest U.S. health care firm-a vertically integrated conglomerate with an estimated $7.6 billion in
annual revenues. Waldholz, American Hospital Plans to Merge with Hospital Corp. in Stock Swap,
Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1; Koten & Waldholz, Baxter Travenol Bids $3.6 Billion for
Supply Firm, Wall St. J., June 24, 1985, at 2, col. 2; Koten, Baxter to Buy American Hospital
Supply, Wall St. J., July 16, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
9. See Gray, Overview, supra note 4, at 17-19. This diversification and imitation of for-profit
providers is a major trend among big city voluntary hospitals. Its extent is evident from the incorpora-
tion of Voluntary Hospitals of America, recently formed by 62 voluntary hospitals. Its subsidiary
activities, all of which are for-profit, extend to management services, physician recruitment, outpatient
services, supply services, financing and insurance. Id. at 18. See also VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS OF
AMERICA, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT.
10. One example is the active debate in recent years in the New England Journal of Medicine
over the seemliness of proprietary agencies treating end-stage renal disease. See, Lowrie & Hampers,
The Success of Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 434 (1981)
("The Case for Profits and the Private Marketplace"); Relman & Rennie, Treatment of
End-Stage Renal Disease: Free But Not Equal, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 996 (1980) (examination of
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that rational appraisal of where we are and where we are going is
difficult.
Questions are often raised as to whether nonprofits behave inefficiently
or whether they provide useful services that profit-making competitors
shun. Other questions ask whether doctors are compromised by working
in hospitals controlled by corporations seeking profit. The debate is often
cast as a battle over how to rationalize an industry that grew fat, sloppy,
and uncontrollable in an era of increased subsidies for medical care, medi-
cal research, and medical tinkering. Few analyses of health care services
manage to emerge without being cast in the language of good and evil,
delight and doom, prudence and waste. The nonprofit form is lauded or
derided, seen as inherently inefficient or a benevolent community institu-
tion, regarded as threatened or about to recover.11 The growth of for-
profit chains prompts journalistic categorization, and new monikers pro-
duce an acronymic frenzy-AMI, HCA, VHA.12 Arnold Relman's "New
Medical Industrial Complex" (NMIC), modeled on President
Eisenhower's dreaded military industrial complex of the 1950's,"s is but
'the most striking example. In a four hundred billion dollar industry, there
is more than enough money to finance companies of public relations spe-
cialists and lobbyists, all of whom can be relied on to produce dear or
dread emblems of a benevolent or beastly past, a wondrous or dangerous
present, and a hopeful or fearful future. 4
the variation in levels of dialysis treatment both nationally and internationally); Gardner, Profit and
the End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 461 (1981) (asking why more "for-
profit" dialysis facilities are associated with relatively fewer patients receiving transplants and under-
going dialysis at home).
11. For a critical assessment of nonprofit hospitals, see Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the
Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1416 (1980); Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights
in Hospital Management, 15 J. L. & ECON. 363 (1972).
12. American Medical International; Hospital Corporation of America; Voluntary Hospitals of
America.
13. Relman, supra note 2, at 963.
14. The clash of views is really quite stark. Criticizing the role of nonprofits, Clark states:
Nonprofit hospitals may be operationally inefficient compared to their for-profit counterparts.
Moreover, the nonprofit form may have played a key role in leading to both wasteful over-
capacity of medical facilities in some areas and slow response to demand in others, while
promoting the development of extremely costly and not truly justified 'high technology' medical
care.
Clark, supra note 11, at 1417-18.
Criticizing to the growth of proprietary organizations in health, Reiman states:
[Tihe private health-care industry can be expected to ignore relatively inefficient and unprofit-
able services, regardless of medical or social need. The result is likely to exacerbate present
problems with excessive fragmentation of care, overspecialism, and overemphasis on expensive
technology.
Relman, supra note 2, at 969. See also Relman, Investor-Owned Hospitals and Heal:h-Care Costs,
309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370, 372 (1983) ("Judged not as businesses but as hospitals, which are
supposed to serve the public interest, they [investor owned chain hospitals] have been less cost-effective
than their not-for-profit counterparts.").
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B. Refocusing the Debate
The debate over the proper ownership of health institutions has been
complicated by an unfortunate tendency to equate profit-making with
market-based allocations of services, to equate the proprietary form with
profit-making, and to cast ownership-related issues as crucial to the future
evolution of American medicine. There may be strong reasons to favor
more or less reliance on markets in allocating some health services, but
these can be separated in principle and practice from analyses of the
appropriate role of for-profit or nonprofit health care." Changes in the
ownership mix of health care providers may well have some important
implications for health policy, but completely eliminating either for-profit
or nonprofit providers would remedy few, if any, of the problems facing
health policy-makers.
The relationship between provider and consumer of medical services
differs in several important ways from that for other services. The asym-
metry of information between the provider and the patient is more pro-
nounced than for most services, even compared to areas in which nonprofit
ownership is common.' The importance of these asymmetries is height-
ened by the complex emotions associated with the trauma of injury and
dread disease. For many, it is crucial that the relationship between pro-
vider and patient be one of "care-giving" for in no other service except
perhaps prostitution is the pursuit of profit alone considered to be so anti-
thetical to the personalized relationship that is seen as most desirable.
Consideration of this asymmetry of information-and the accompanying
trust patients must place in providers-has, in the past, shaped the poli-
cies that constrain the practices of health professionals. 17 The medical
professions have gained unusual authority in the belief that professional
norms and sanctions would appropriately limit medical behavior. 8 There
have been extensive attempts to encourage the ethic of care-giving through
15. See A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COST OF MEDICAL CARE 70-92 (1980) (advocating increased reliance on competitive market forces as
the answer to rising health care costs); Dunham, Morone & White, Restoring Medical Markets:
Implications for the Poor, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 488 (1982) (suggesting that current pro-
posals for increased competition would only partially solve inflation problem while significantly reduc-
ing health services for the poor).
16. Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations and The Market in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK (W. Powell ed. forthcoming).
17. The nonprofit has traditionally been the protector of consumers or purchasers of services from
"contract failure." By virtue of its distribution prohibition, the nonprofit protects the buyer against the
misdelivery of services he cannot monitor or understand. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit
Organization, supra note 1. Given that, in the case of health care, this protective function was vested
in the doctor as the patient's agent, this traditional role of the nonprofit was less important than in
other spheres.
18. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcON. REV. 941,
951-53 (1963).
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education, honorific example, and nonmonetary rewards. 9 The judgment
that professional norms are insufficient to regulate the medical industry
has led to extensive legislation to limit costs, maintain quality, and
broaden access to medical care." Many of these policies have been explic-
itly designed to promote nonprofit organizations, either by enforcing less
stringent regulations on them or providing subsidies not available to their
for-profit counterparts. "Numerous statutes, regulations, and judicial doc-
trines," we are reminded, "discriminate against for-profit hospitals"'"
including preferential access to construction grants, subsidies for training
programs, and planning and operational assistance for a range of health
services. 2
The current debate has confused the fundamental concerns over cost,
quality, and access with issues of ownership. Casting the argument in
terms of a choice between legal forms in health care obscures the historical
sources of the present situation. What we are witnessing is a heightening
of an older fundamental tension within medicine over whose interests
should predominate. The steady pressure of rising costs, combined with
the opportunities to earn high returns in medical care, have caused this
tension to resurface.
Designing policies to meet the current situation is made more difficult
by the complexity of medicine and, as shown in Table 1, the diversity of
institutions providing services. Nonprofit organizations treat acute ill-
ness, 2  palliate chronic conditions,24 and provide supportive services such
19. The importance of nonmonetary incentives in health care has led Robert G. Evans to define
the "not-only-for-profit" sector. This designation refers to individuals and firms "in which a legal
claimant to profits is well-defined, but profits represent only one among several competing objectives
of the firm's ownership and management." R. EVANS, supra note 3, at 127.
20. The resulting regulation rejected the view that the organization of medical care should be the
province solely of doctors and hospitals. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 402; Brown, The Proper Bounda-
ries of the Role of Government, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 15, 22-23 (1986). Thus, the perspective
of health professionals was counterbalanced by that of consumers who were required to compose a
majority of the membership of state health planning councils, Comprehensive Health Planning and
Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, § 314(a)(2)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 246(a)(2)(b) (1982), and
health systems agencies (HSAs), The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, § 1512, 42 U.S.C. § 3001(1)(b)(3)(C)(i) (1982).
Among the chief concerns of the statute were the maldistribution of health care services and inade-
quate access available to the disadvantaged. The National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1974, § 1502(1), 42 U.S.C. §300k-2(a)(1) (1982). See also M. RAFFEL, THE U.S.
HEALTH SYSTEM: ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS 601-02 (1980).
Examples of the effort to control the cost and quality of the services that all patients receive are The
Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 249F, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1320c-19 (1982), and The
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, § 1513(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
2(a) (1982). See also M. RAFFEL, supra, at 601-02.
For additional detail on legislative efforts to control cost, quality, and access, see infra note 77.
21. Clark, supra note 11, at 1473.
22. Id. at 1473-75. Ownership based incentives, however, have often been unnecessary or even
counterproductive to primary policy goals. See infra Part IV (A).
23. Examples of nonprofit organizations which treat acute illness include hospitals, health
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TABLE 1
Share of For-Profit, Private Nonprofit, and Public
Providers in Health Care Markets
Services Measured In Percent of Services Provided By
(Year) Terms Of For-Profit Nonprofit Public
Short-Term General
Hospitals
(1980) Beds- 8.8% 69.9% 21.3%
Psychiatric Hospitals
(1981) Beds 6.0 4.7 89.3
Nursing Homes
(1976) Beds 68.8 20.0 11.2
Homes for Mentally
Handicapped
(1976) Residents 46.2 37.7 16.5
Blood Banks
(1976) Facilities 63.3 5.8 30.9
Dialysis Centers Dialysis
(1981) Units 33.0 51.3 15.7
Health Insurance
(1978) Enrollees 43.4 46.1 10.6
Home Health Agencies
(1983) Visits 25.5 64.1 10.4
Source: M. Schlesinger, Public, For-Profit and Private Nonprofit Enterprises: A Study of Mixed
Industries 6-8, 76-80 (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin at
Madison).
as insurance,25 education and lobbying,26 and research. 27 Because the
institutional missions and the roles of professionals vary greatly across
health services, it is not surprising, as will be shown below, that the
implications of ownership vary as well.
II. The Lessons of History: An Examination of the Role of Nonprofits
in the Provision of Medical Services
The relative importance of nonprofit and for-profit health institutions
has fluctuated over time. Services that are now dominated by nonprofit
institutions, such as acute care hospitals, were at one time predominantly
maintenance organizations, and neighborhood health centers.
24. Examples of institutions which palliate chronic conditions include home health agencies,
nursing homes, and renal dialysis centers.
25. Blue Cross and Blue Shield are the foremost examples of such organizations.
26. The American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association supply examples
of this education and lobbying function.
27. Nonprofit organizations which conduct research include, among many others, the March of
Dimes and the American Cancer Society.
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investor-owned. Services that now have a substantial proprietary compo-
nent, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and renal
dialysis facilities, were only fifteen years ago almost exclusively provided
by private nonprofit and public agencies.2 These variations in patterns of
ownership suggest that diverse and interrelated factors determine the scale
and role of nonprofit enterprise in medical care. Three distinct historical
periods of change in the mix of ownership form throughout the medical
care industry emerge from our investigations.
A. 1900-1950: The Institutionalization of Health Care and the
Dominance of Nonprofit Organizations
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, medical care was largely a
"cottage industry." Hospitals were principally facilities for caring for the
sickly poor. Those with higher incomes were treated at home by physi-
cians. Hospitals and physicians co-existed, the former supported by reli-
gious organizations and government subsidies, the latter by fees from
patients.29 Because of their religious affiliations, most hospitals established
during this period were nonprofit. Toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, the practice of medicine became more complex and physi-
cians began treating more of their patients in hospitals. Hospitals evolved
into the primary setting for treating the very ill and began to require
patient fees for support."0 In this evolution, for-profit and nonprofit hospi-
tals retained many of the distinctions which had previously existed
between doctors and hospitals. The for-profit facilities generally continued
to be operated by a single doctor or small group of physicians and catered
to wealthier patients."1 The usually larger nonprofit hospitals continued to
rely heavily on philanthropic support, although cost increases eventually
created pressure for more sophisticated management techniques and some
patient payment.3 2
28. M. Schlesinger, Public, For-Profit and Private Nonprofit Enterprises: A Study of Mixed In-
dustries 80 (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison).
29. On the progress of hospitals in the nineteenth century, see M. RAFFEL, supra note 20, at 241-
46; P. STARR, supra note 3, at 145-79; Stevens, "A Poor Sort of Memory": Voluntary Hospitals and
Government before the Depression, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 551, 552-55 (1982).
30. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 157, 160-61.
31. Id. at 165.
32. Id. at 160-61. The absence or presence of philanthropy led to pronounced regional variations
in ownership mix. The East and Midwest, populated by service-oriented religions and philanthropi-
cally minded capitalists, were dominated by nonprofit hospitals. The West, however, lacked a strong
philanthropic tradition, having been settled after hospitals had begun to rely more heavily on patient
fees for support and after the charitable mission of care for the poor was no longer the hospital's sole
function. Here, for-profit hospitals were far more common. Id., at 170-71.
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As the country grew to the West during the late nineteenth century,
proprietary hospitals and medical schools proliferated." At the same time
the growth of nonprofit facilities was further inhibited because the newly
developed facilities in the West relied less upon government subsidies and
more heavily upon income from private patients.-4 By 1900, sixty percent
of the hospitals in operation were privately owned, usually by one
doctor. 5
The subsequent fifty years brought increased formalization, standardi-
zation, and institutionalization to American medicine. Medical schools,
hospitals, and, to a lesser extent, nursing homes, became more uniform
and more technically-oriented. The increasing complexity of medical care
raised the cost of both medical training and treatment, creating a greater
need for funds in the form of either increased government financing or
larger payments from patients.8 This financial pressure in turn favored
the growth of new nonprofit institutions which could tap religious affilia-
tions,87 offer income tax deductions,88 and remain informally exempt from
growing government regulation.89
Economic incentives and professional interests combined to make the
nonprofit form more strongly favored by a large proportion of the medical
profession. The increased emphasis on the technical aspects of medicine
and the institutions' dependence on fee-paying patients allowed doctors to
become the dominant decision-makers in hospitals.40 Rejecting for-profit
enterprise reduced the threat of corporate control over physician author-
ity." Since antitrust laws were only loosely appled to nonprofit institu-
tions, the nonprofit also provided a way to control entry into medicine and
to enhance the financial returns of a medical practice. 2
33. For a discussion of the increased number of proprietary hospitals, see id. at 165. The rise of
proprietary medical schools is described in R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 24-25 (1971).
34. Stevens, supra note 33, at 560. See also P. STARR, supra note 3, at 160 (discussing the 1904
New York City hospital finance crisis in which private hospitals found government had its own cost
problems and money was not readily available).
35. Bays, Why Most Private Hospitals are Nonprofit, 2 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 367
(1983). There was not yet a technological justification for big institutions, and in most cases the small
proprietary hospital/clinic corresponded well to the then-dominant solo practice.
36. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 159-61.
37. The importance of religious organizations in the development of hospitals is detailed in P.
STARR, supra note 3, at 169-77. Their role in establishing nursing homes is discussed in B.
VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME TRAGEDY 35 (1980).
38. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), 170(c), 501(c)(3) (1985).
39. W. NIELSEN, THE ENDANGERED SECTOR 184 (1979).
40. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 161. But see W. NIELSEN, supra note 39, at 178 (discussing the
split between "two lines of authority"-the clinical and the administrative-which developed in the
1930's and 1940's).
41. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 215-220.
42. See Horty & Mulholland, Legal Differences Between Investor-Owned and Nonprofit Health
Care Institutions, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 17 (B. Gray ed. 1983).
Vol. 3: 313, 1986
Nonprofits In Health Care
The trend toward the nonprofit form was reinforced, in the short run,
by the introduction of health insurance during the early 1930's .4  Faced
both with proposals for national health insurance and with financially
strained hospitals, the American Medical Association abandoned its ear-
lier rigid opposition to hospital insurance." With the cooperation of the
American Hospital Association and enabling legislation passed by state
governments,45 Blue Cross and later Blue Shield ("the Blues") were
established to offer hospital and medical insurance, respectively.
These provider-sponsored plans were organized as nonprofit enterprises
for several reasons. Physician autonomy was, as noted before, promoted
by the nonprofit corporate form." In addition, the insurance companies
worked closely with providers. Proprietary ownership of these health in-
surance companies might well have raised questions about the appropri-
ateness of the nonprofit status of hospitals."' Finally, state enabling
One view suggests that American medicine became more mercenary in 1920 with a change in the
control of American medicine. The purpose of the new group of leaders was to improve their eco-
nomic position and to protect their freedom from social or governmental controls. Nielsen asserts that
because the individual states worked closely with and patterned their licensing statutes on those sug-
gested by the American Medical Association (AMA) and state medical societies, the AMA was largely
responsible for the one-third decline in the number of proprietary medical schools and the one-half
decrease in the number of medical graduates. W. NIELSEN, supra note 39, at 106. See also Bays,
supra note 35, at 367 (providing figures on the relative numbers of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals).
The remaining for-profit institutions were disproportionately located in fast growing areas, where
population increased faster than philanthropic voluntarism supplied new capital or where the philan-
thropic tradition was weak. Steinwald & Neuhauser, The Role of the Proprietary Hospital, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROias. 817, 819-20 (1970). See generally Weller, The Primacy of Standard Antitrust
Analysis in Health Care, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1983) (an historical review of antitrust
enforcement of health care).
43. The origin of Blue Cross is traced to 1929 when Dr. Justin Ford Kimball established a
hospital insurance plan at Baylor University Hospital. See M. RAFFEL, supra note 20, at 393-94
(1980); P. STARR, supra note 3, at 295-98. Thirty-nine Blue Cross plans were established in the
early 1930's. S. LAW, BLUE CRoss: WHAT WENT WRONG? 6-7 (1974). State and federal financing
of medical services for the poor was also instituted on a limited basis through New Deal legislation.
See P. STARR, supra note 3, at 270-75; R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA 13-14 (1974).
44. W. NIELSEN, supra note 39, at 112.
45. See generally Rorem, Enabling Legislation for Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROas. 528 (1939) (a study of hospital service plans and enabling acts including an
appendix containing a "Proposed Model Law to Enable the Formation of Non-Profit Hospital Ser-
vice Associations Under the Supervision of the Various State Departments of Insurance"); S. LAW,
supra note 43, at 8-11 (review of the early history of hospital service plans); P. STARR, supra note 3,
at 295-98 (brief history of "The Birth of the Blues"). As of 1978, 48 states had enabling legislation
for such hospital service organizations. S. LAW, supra note 43, at 9 n.36.
46. For a review of AMA resistance to various other forms of health insurance, as well as to the
"corporate" practice of medicine, see W. NIELSEN, supra note 39, at 105-16; P. STARR, supra note
3, at 299-306. The AMA's resistance to group health practice eventually resulted in its conviction for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
47. In Associated Hosp. Serv. Inc. v City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d. 447, 109 N.W.2d 271
(1961), for example, the court concluded that the legislature had the right to grant nonprofit status to
the Blue Cross plan specifically because it was closely associated with nonprofit hospitals. 109
N.W.2d at 282-83. The American Hospital Association owned the name "Blue Cross of America"
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legislation granted to the Blues what were effectively state-sanctioned mo-
nopolies in providing "service-benefit" plans.48 Legislators, no doubt, fa-
vored nonprofit ownership in part to avoid the appearance of having sanc-
tioned organizations which could extract monopoly profits from the health
industry."'
The appropriate legal status of these health insurance plans was a mat-
ter of considerable dispute.50 To bolster their claim to nonprofit status, the
Blues adopted the policy of community rating, charging all residents of a
community the same premium. This effectively subsidized the old and the
poor who could afford to purchase insurance but who still had higher
than average medical expenses.51
The growth of Blue Cross and Blue Shield reinforced the dominant
position of nonprofit organizations in medicine. By the early 1940's, non-
profit plans controlled more than two-thirds of the health insurance mar-
ket.52 Blue Cross negotiated lower reimbursement rates for proprietary
hospitals than for their nonprofit counterparts. This discrimination accel-
erated the decline of investor-owned facilities which by 1946 represented
less than ten percent of all hospitals."3 Physicians remained uncontested in
their authority to control both the delivery and financing of medical care,
authority mediated first by the nonprofit hospitals and later by Blue
Cross. Nevertheless, the growth of insurance under the auspices of the
until 1972.
48. See S. LAW, supra note 43, at 8-9.
49 As Sylvia Law has written, "[Hjistorically, the combination of public enabling legislation and
the private power of the [American Hospital Association] has assured that there is only one Blue
Cross organization in any given area and that it is, to some degree, controlled by the hospitals." Id. at
11.
50. About half the states refused to grant the plans tax exempt status. As of 1978 the twenty
states which granted exempt status to the plans were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 9 n.37.
According to Law:
Special corporate status and exemption from federal and state taxes seem to be based on a
concept of social reform and utility rather than on any particular concrete characteristics of the
Blue Cross plans. Neither the legislative history nor cases involving the validity of the tax
exempt status provides much insight into the justification for the favored status of hospital
service plans over commercial hospital insurers. State tax exemption has been challenged by
tax collectors in five states. In all but one, the courts held that Blue Cross was not entitled to
exemption from payment of state taxes, even though it had been characterized as charitable or
benevolent by the legislature.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
Blue Cross plans are exempt from Federal income tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1985). A
§ 501(c)(4) organization is exempt from federal income tax, but contributions to such an organzation
are not tax deductible by the contributor.
51. Coverage was rarely offered on a sliding scale or discounted in any other fashion for low-
income subscribers. See P. STARR, supra note 3, at 309; S. LAW, supra note 43, at 12.
52. M. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 79.
53. Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 42, at 817, 819.
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Blues was to sow the seeds of the eventual rebirth of proprietary institu-
tions in medicine.
B. 1950-1975: Public Financing and the Renaissance of
Proprietary Health Care
Following World War II, as federal policy-makers became increasingly
concerned with encouraging access to medical care, legislation was passed
subsidizing the medical industry." At first, funds were paid directly to
providers who agreed to care for the poor.55 Later subsidies were directed
at increasing the effective demand of patients for medical care. Unsuccess-
ful attempts at national health insurance in the 1940's precipitated the
drive in the 1950's for government health insurance covering the elderly.
This led eventually to enactment of the Medicare program in 1965.58
Initially, the direct public financing of facilities tended to enhance the
position of nonprofit institutions by making funds available either exclu-
sively or preferentially to private nonprofit or public agencies. The post-
war Hill-Burton program,57 for example, subsidized construction of a
variety of nonprofit and public health care facilities, though funds were
primarily allocated to the construction of short-term general hospitals. 58
Because nonprofit agencies were relatively slow to respond to subsidies,
however, their share of services increased only marginally despite the
availability of these funds.' Moreover, by stimulating the expansion of
public facilities, government subsidies indirectly altered, and to some
extent undermined, the traditional role of private nonprofit medical care.
Health institutions operated by state and local government grew rapidly
during this period.60 This growth, in turn, shifted much of the
54. See J. LAVE & L. LAVE, THE HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION AcT (1974); Rosenblatt, Health
Care Reform, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 264-270 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o) (1982 & Supp. V 1985) (establishing federal funding for
construction and modernization of hospitals and other health care facilities).
56. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 §§ 1801-1875, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz) (1982 & Supp. V 1985) (Medicare Act provid-
ing hospital and medical insurance for the aged, financed by federal payroll taxes); Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 §§ 1901-1905, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §1396-1396q) (1982 & Supp. V 1985) (Medicaid Act establishing federal matching funds for
state medical assistance to the indigent). See also T. MARMOR, THE POLrrics OF MEDICARE 13-16
(1973).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1982).
58. Hill-Burton subsidized one-third of all hospital construction projects between 1947 and 1972,
supplying about ten percent of the total capital costs. J. LAVE & L. LAVE, supra note 54, at 16.
59. Id. at 44-47; see also B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 42 (discussing 1956 Social Security
amendments which although significantly boosting available federal funds for nursing home care, were
not widely taken advantage of by the states).
60. Between 1946 and 1960, the number of beds in short-term public hospitals increased from
approximately 133,000 to 156,000. Between 1949 and 1959, the number of beds in public psychiatric
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responsibility of caring for the poor to public institutions and away from
their private nonprofit counterparts. 1 Coupled with the availability of
public funds for capital projects, this shift reduced the apparent need for
donative financing which had been one of the chief justifications for non-
profit status.
In the 1960's and continuing through the mid-1970's, government
involvement expanded from subsidies for facilities to support for health
insurance and direct payment for medical care. The passage of Medicare
and Medicaid in 1965,62 and amendments to Social Security in 19726' and
1974," reflected this development. As Table 2 illustrates, this legislation
had a significant impact on the mix of ownership in American medicine.
Rapidly growing health insurance-public and private-almost invari-
ably led to a striking increase in the proportion of services provided by
proprietary institutions.65 The reasons for this growth are complex, but
they probably reflect both organizational conflicts within nonprofit agen-
cies and the ability of investor-owned organizations to acquire capital
more readily.66
This pattern was first evident in the health insurance industry itself.
Wage freezes during World War II and the Korean War prompted
unions to push for increases in non-wage benefits. The most prominent
growth took place in health insurance, with the number of enrollees grow-
ing sharply from less than thirteen million in 1940 to over 100 million in
hospitals increased from 596,000 to 672,000, and from 1954 to 1973, the number of beds in public
nursing homes increased from 27,000 to 106,000. M. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 76-77.
61. See Gage, Impact on the Public Hospitals, 61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 75, 77 (1985); Feder,
Hadley & Mullner, Falling Through the Cracks: Poverty, Insurance Coverage, and Hospital Care
for the Poor, 1980 and 1982, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 544 (1984).
62. See supra note 56. T. MARMOR, supra note 56, at 2 (summary of government involvement in
medicine after 1945); R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 43 (a history and survey of the Medi-
caid program); see also Brown, Technocratic Corporatism and Administrative Reform in Medicare,
10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 579 (1985) (examining administrative efforts to reform Medicare
and the post-1977 federal activism which the author labels "technocratic corporatism")
63. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
64. Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-368, 88 Stat. 420 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
65. See, e.g., B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 105 (describing wave of nursing home construction
in 1950's).
66. Policy analysts also suggest that proprietary hospitals tend to be smaller, and thus require less
capital formation. See Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 42, at 828.
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TABLE 2
Market Share of For-Profit Health Care Providers Before and After
Implementation of Public Subsidies
Market Share of Proprietary Agencies
Change in 3-5 Years Before 3-5 Years After
Type of Facility Coverage Change Change
Short-term General Medicare 5.8% 6.2%
Enacted 1965
Nursing Homes Medicaid 60 72
Enacted 1965
Dialysis Centers Medicare 4 21
Covered 1972
Home Health Medicare Adds 7 25
Agencies Coverage 1981
Psychiatric States Mandate 1 6
Hospitals Private Insurance
Coverage 1975-80
Source: M. Schlesinger, Public, For-Profit and Nonprofit Enterprises: A Study of Mixed Industries
76-78, 80 (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison).
1955. 6 With this growth in health insurance coverage, the market share
of commercial insurers increased from thirty percent in 1940 to fifty-two
percent in 1960.8
The growth of proprietary providers was even more pronounced after
the enactment in 1965 of Medicare and Medicaid." Initial implementa-
tion of these two programs boosted the relative share of services provided
by investor-owned hospitals and nursing homes.7 0 The subsequent expan-
sion of Medicare benefits in the 1970's encouraged the growth of for-
profit renal dialysis centers and home health agencies while similar
expansions of investor owned psychiatric facilities resulted from other
public financing.
7 1
The expansion of investor-owned insurers increased competitive pres-
sures on nonprofit insurance organizations. Commercial insurers offered
policies based on the experience of particular groups rather than the over-
all health care use in the community. For groups with below average risk
of illness, including many employee groups, this experience rating offered
much lower premiums than did community rating. During the 1950's a
67. M. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 79.
68. Id.
69. See Table 2.
70. See generally P. STARR, supra note 3, at 434 ("Expanding private insurance and Medicare
gave the financial impetus to proprietary chains.").
71. See Table 2, supra.
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number of employee groups shifted from the Blues to commercial carriers,
and others threatened to do so. In the face of this competitive pressure,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield virtually abandoned community rating by the
1960's, eliminating the implicit subsidy to high risk individuals.72
This was but the first example of a number of changes in the services
offered by nonprofit health providers faced with competition from
investor-owned institutions. The breadth and significance of these
changes, however, became apparent only in combination with other
changes in American medicine. The introduction of Medicare and Medi-
caid, together with the growth of private health insurance, sharply in-
creased the flow of funds into the health industry and transformed
medicine into a virtual gold-mine for commercial nonprofit as well as for-
profit enterprises.78
Although third-party payment was a key transformative factor for
American medicine, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, like hospitals, did little
to threaten the autonomy of physicians. The benign nature of Medicare's
early administration and the regularity of its payment reinforced the ear-
lier patterns of third-party private insurers. The result was that, both
before and after Medicare's passage, the power to determine medical costs
still lay within the medical profession, whose interests continued to be
furthered, though less directly, through Blue Cross.
Government health insurance prompted a period of extended growth
for American medical institutions. Medicare permitted generous deprecia-
tion allowances for capital and, by reimbursing capital costs which were
plowed back into the cost base, inserted an inflationary factor into its own
payments, which were then determined by the provider-dominated insur-
ers. 74 It was thus no surprise that the rate of hospital room charges
increased at over twice the annual rate of the consumer price index.75
72. See J. KRIZAY & A. WILSON, THE PATIENT AS CONSUMER 40 (1974).
73. The relative position of Blue Cross also improved as a result of Medicare since organizational
participants in the plan were permitted to adopt a "fiscal intermediary" rather than deal directly with
the Social Security Administration. The majority of hospitals and other organizatons chose Blue
Cross. Similarly, the government had to choose insurance agencies and most of these were Blue Shield
plans. See P. STARR, supra note 3, at 375. See also J. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FED-
FRAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 37 (1977); S. LAW, supra note 43, at 31-41; T. MARMOR, supra note
56 at 141. This concession signified an accomodating disposition toward hospitals and physicians in
Medicare's first years of operation. Moreover, Blue Cross' cost-based scheme of hospital reimburse-
ment, transferred nearly intact to Medicare, meant that Blue Cross assumed a far more important
position than when it was simply in the business of selling group hospitalization insurance. S. LAW,
supra note 43, at 63-65, 93-102.
74. J. FEDER, supra note 73, at 113-17.
75. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH AND PREVENTION PROFILE 264 (1983) (pre-
publication copy). See generally A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 15; Marmor, Wittman & Heagy, The
Politics of Medical Inflation, in T. MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND AMERICAN MEDICAL CARE
61 (1983) [hereinafter cited as T. MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALYSIS].
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High levels of medical inflation continued throughout the 1970's, 6 as
reform efforts concentrated on new forms of health regulation and new
methods of delivering care. Regulatory initiatives such as Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) and Health System Agencies
(HSAs) were begun with national health insurance, in the minds of some
reformers. National health insurance, however, never materialized, leav-
ing the federal government and the health industry with fragmented con-
trols. The inflationary forces at work in medicine-principally broad
health insurance coverage, pluralistic financing, and weak countervailing
regulatory authorities-worked their will throughout the 1970's. The dec-
ade began with marked medical inflation, witnessed hopeful initiatives
along with frustrated public reform aimed at bringing access, cost, and
humane health care into a reasonable equilibrium, and ended with a
strong mandate for cost control in Washington.7
76. See Schlesinger & Blumenthal, Ownership and Access to Health Care: New Evidence and
Policy Implications, NEW ENG. J. MED. (1986) (forthcoming).
77. The Federal Government encouraged the growth of pre-paid health plans by passing the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat.
2225 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which authorized a system of local health
planning organizations or health systems agencies (HSAs), to be dominated by consumers, designed to
cut the costs of medical care, guarantee quality, and improve access. The restraining effects of these
HSAs, however, were modest. See Morone & Marmor, Representing Consumer Interests: The Case
of American Health Planning in T. MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 76; P.
STARR, supra note 3, at 416.
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have become an alternative in many communities.
Patients pay a flat annual sum and directly receive a wide array of medical services. The HMO must
provide services within a fixed budget determined by the number of subscribers. See ANDERSON,
HEROLD, BUTLER, KOHRMAN & MORRISON, HMO DEVELOPMENT: PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS
(1985).
Further examples of efforts to control the cost of health care include the enactment of Certificate of
Need (CON) programs which require state approval of construction and large capital programs
planned by medical institutions. P. STARR, supra note 3, at 398. Other regulatory attempts to control
medical costs included requirements for prior authorization, restrictions on capital expenditures, and
reductions in the number of hospital beds. See Brown, Public Hospitals on the Brink. Their Problems
and Their Options, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 927, 936-37 (1983). More recently, in the 1980's,
the federal government has attempted to control costs by establishing Diagnostic Related Groups
(DRGs) which establish price limitations on a variety of hospital services. See generally Morone &
Dunham, Slouching Towards National Health Insurance: The New Health Care Politics, 2 YALE J.
ON REG. 263 (1985) (a discussion of New Jersey's experience with DRGs). For a discussion of the
potential ineffectiveness of restrictions on capital expenditures as a cost controlling mechanism, see
Marmor, Wittman & Heagy, The Politics of Medical Inflation in T. MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALY-
SIS, supra note 75, at 61, 72. See generally Brown, supra note 20, at 23-24; A. ENTHOVEN, supra
note 15 (discussing medical inflation); Marmor & Dunham, The Politics of Health Policy Reform:
Problems, Origins, Alternatives, and a Possible Prescription, in CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY
HEALTH CARE: HOW TO IMPROVE IT AND PAY FOR IT 34-35 (1985) (discussing fragmentary regu-
lations of the 1970's); P. STARR, supra note 3, at 381-411, 436-39; Starr & Marmor, The United
States: A Social Forecast, in THE END OF AN ILLUSION 234 (J. de Kervosdoui, J. Kimberly & V.
Rodwin eds. 1984).
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) are an example of the effort to control the
quality (as well as the cost) of medical care. They function:
by reviewing admissions to a health care facility, certifying the necessity for continuing treat-
ment in an in-patient facility, reviewing other extended or costly treatment, conducting medical
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C. 1975-1986: The Debate over Containment of Health Costs and the
Growth of Price Competition
By the 1970's policymakers and Americans generally were alarmed by
the persistent growth of medical costs. This led directly to some changes in
the health industry-the growth of prospective payment, the increased
consolidation of insurance and service delivery within pre-paid health
plans, and a variety of regulatory measures.78 It has also had some indi-
rect effects. These have included threats to the financial stability of gov-
ernment-operated health facilities and subtle shifts in popular expectations
about the responsiblity of health facilities to the communities in which
they are located.
Perhaps the most important development is increased price competition
among suppliers of medical services. This price competition has taken a
number of forms. A variety of negotiated arrangements, including "pre-
ferred provider" and "exclusive provider" agreements, have been estab-
lished to channel patients to a single or small group of providers in return
for price discounts.79 Third-party payers have negotiated more actively
over prices, eroding the ability of hospitals to cross-subsidize particular
types of care and patients.80 HMOs, with historically lower rates of
hospitalization and costs, have grown substantially, with enrollment in-
creasing from less than six million in 1975 to over twelve million in
1983.81
evaluation studies, regularly reviewing facility, practitioner and health care service profiles of
care and reviewing facility and practitioner records as applicable to a particular review
process.
M. RAFFEL, supra note 20, at 282 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
PSRO FACTBOOK 2-3 (1977)).
78. See supra note 77.
79. Rice, Lissovoy, Gabel & Ermann, The State of PPOs: Results from a National Survey, 4
HEALTH AFF. 25 (1985) (report on the status of Preferred Provider Organizations).
80. Sloan & Becker, Cross-Subsidies and Payment for Hospital Care, 8 J. HEALTH POL. POL'v
& L. 660, 677-78 (1984); Clark, supra note 11, at 1480-81.
81. This growth should be interpreted with caution. In simple terms, doubling market share in
any industry from five to ten percent is easier than increasing that share from ten to twenty. HMO
enrollment was quite low a decade ago, and the doubling of its clientele from that level need not
foreshadow similar rates of growth on the now higher base. Secondly, what counts as a Health Main-
tenance Organization has, over time, been defined more loosely, now including, for example, groups of
physicians coordinated under a pre-payment rubric of IPAs (individual practice associations). Thirdly,
as HMOs have grown, they have increasingly come to be owned by other firms in the health industry
such as Blue Cross, Blue Shield, commercial health insurance firms like Prudential, and, more re-
cently, some for-profit hospital chains. These changes in corporate governance make the character of
the HMO industry quite different from the model organization that the HMO Act of 1973 envi-
sioned. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914.
Finally, it hardly needs pointing out that it is the financial incentives of pre-paid group practice,
not the legal category of health maintenance organizations, that explain most of the cost-restraining
effects associated in the literature with HMOs. Luft rightly cautions that most of the cost-saving
effects arise from more restrained use of hospitalization, some of which in turn is explained by
the healthier populations who joined the earlier groups. Luft, How Do Health-Maintenance
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Increased competition in health care has significantly affected the role
of private nonprofit providers. The decline of cross-subsidies of patients
and services has reduced the ability of nonprofit institutions to offer
unprofitable services, which had previously distinguished them from their
for-profit counterparts. 2 On the other hand, the loss of cross-subsidies
and the increased dumping of the sickest patients from private facilities
has threatened the financial stability of many public institutions."
Between 1977 and 1983, 128 short-term hospitals operated by state and
local governments were closed, a seven percent decline." Ironically, the
need for charity from private health institutions seems to be growing
when nonprofit organizations are least willing to meet that need.
At the same time, there have been subtle shifts in popular expectations
about the responsibilities of health providers. Patients in the past have
relied significantly on a physician's competence and fiduciary responsibil-
ity. The basis for this trust seems to be eroding as the service ethic in
health care has been demythologized and a more commercially oriented
ethic has developed among providers. These changes have been accompa-
nied by a loss of professional authority and autondmy. Some of the power
once wielded by physicians has shifted to those who previously supported
them-the financial and operating officers of hospitals, prepaid group
practices, and both Blue Cross and Blue Shield.
Increased competition and decreased professional autonomy have
reduced or eliminated some of the goals and practices which once distin-
guished nonprofit from for-profit providers of health care. Nonprofit insti-
tutions increasingly imitate their investor-owned competitors by establish-
ing holding companies, for-profit subsidiaries, multi-facility chains, and
by creating hierarchical structures which add to the role and discretion of
non-physician managers.85 As with the Blues in the late 1950's, there is
arguably a convergence in practice between nonprofit and for-profit health
care facilities. At the 1985 annual meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association, for example, Dr. Eisenberg of Harvard Medical School ob-
served that:
Organizations Achieve Their "Savings"?, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1336, 1342 (1978). Over time, the
rate of increase in HMO costs has paralleled medical inflation, thus suggesting that the effects of
HMO growth on inflation control have been exaggerated. See L. BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATION: HMOs AS FEDERAL POLICY (1983); H. LuvT, HEALTH MAINTENANCE OR-
GANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE (1981).
82. See Schlesinger & Dorwart, Ownership and Mental-Health Services, 311 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 959 (1984).
83. See Feder & Hadley, The Economically Unattractive Patient: Who Cares?, 61 BULL. N.Y.
ACAD. MED. 68, 70 (1985).
84. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 7 (1983).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
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The worst of it is that voluntaries, unable to cross-subsidize expen-
sive but essential clinical services because of cost-competition, are
becoming ever less distinguishable from the proprietaries, as they
'market', and worse, 'demarket', diversify, 'unbundle', 'spin-off' for-
profit subsidiaries, develop 'convenience-oriented feeder systems', at-
tempt to adjust case mix, and triage admissions by their ability to
pay.86
D. Summary: Historical Lessons on the Role of Nonprofit Health Care
Providers
Our historical review of nonprofits in the health world suggests two
important patterns. First, for each service, there appears to be a "life
cycle" in the role of nonprofit providers. As new services develop, through
technological or social innovation, the initial pioneers are almost always
private nonprofit agencies. This is in part because new services tend to be
expensive and require subsidies from public or philanthropic sources.
Most likely, it also reflects the importance of nonpecuniary goals for the
most innovative providers.
As a health service gains broader acceptance, however, two important
changes occur. First, insurers become more willing to pay for treatment,
86. L. Eisenberg, The Right to Health Care: For Patients or For-Profits (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Dallas, TX, May 21, 1985) (a negative
response to the debate resolution: "Investor Owned Medical Care is a Positive Move for the Field of
Psychiatry"). See generally, Wessel, Hospital Trustees' Role Grows Tougher as Financial and Char-
itable Goals Clash, Wall St. J., March 18, 1986, at 31, col. 3 (discussing the "rising tensions between
trustees' need to be prudent business managers and their desire to keep charitable programs alive.")
Perhaps the most vivid manifestation of this trend toward commercialization and the pressure
toward more businesslike management can be found merely by leafing through the advertisements in a
recent issue of the periodical entitled Healthcare Financial Management. Examples of excerpts from
such ads include: "Now more than ever accounting for costs is an important and challenging responsi-
bility. That's why Ernst & Whinney offers Standard Cost Manager. . .. This means you will be
able to account for labor, material, and other line items in any department for improved decision
making and control .. " HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., April, 1986, at 9; "In today's competitive
marketplace, your hospital's image can significantly effect your ability to accomplish census objec-
tives." Id. at 14; "In this tough, competitive, fast moving environment you need management tools
that can improve your operational efficiency without reducing patient care service levels. That's where
Touche Ross can help." Id. at 69; "Call Owen. We answer with a plan for improving your bottom
line. By improving your pharmacy's operation, just as we have in 130 hospitals nationwide, Owen
will streamline your operation and personnel. . . .And, most importantly, we'll control pharmacy
costs. While safeguarding the highest standards in quality and patient care." Id. at 97.
This same magazine also carries a promotion for an upcoming conference sponsored by the Health
Care Financial Management Educational Foundation entitled "Meeting the Challenge of Change."
The titles of some of the seminars are particularly revealing. Examples include: "Marketing and the
Role of the Chief Financial Officer"; "Acquisitions and Consolidations of Not-for-Profit Hospitals
and Health Care Providers"; "Conversion of Tax-Exempt HMO's to For-Profit Status"; "Creating
Competitive Advantage"; "Financial and Strategic Tools"; "Long-Term Care Business Opportunities
for Growth and Profit"; "Fraud and Abuse in the Competitive Environment." Id. at 18-25.
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and this increases the overall demand for the service.8 7 If this increase is
sufficiently rapid, existing nonprofit providers may not be able to meet the
increased demand for the service. Under these conditions, patients and
their physicians are forced to turn to proprietary agencies to obtain treat-
ment. The resulting entry of for-profit institutions creates competitive
pressures which tend to bring about a convergence between the behavior
of both the nonprofit and for-profit providers. Second, policy makers
become concerned with ensuring adequate access for those unable to pay
for the service. This concern leads them to provide subsidies to public
agencies to supply the poor and uninsured; this, in turn, tends to reduce
the importance of charitable provision of care by private nonprofit
agencies.
To understand the role of nonprofit medical care providers, it is thus
important to know where a particular service lies in this life cycle. For the
health sector as a whole, there will be some services at early stages, some
at intermediate, and some at later stages. HMOs, for example, are just
now moving from the first to the second stage; hospitals are now entering
the last stage.
The second historical pattern indicates that the role of physicians varies
for different types of health related services. The shift in the role of physi-
cians can be seen generally in the relationship between the degree of phy-
sician authority over the delivery of care and the extent to which for-profit
organizations supply a particular service. The health activities in which
doctors play the least important role are precisely those where proprietary
enterprises deliver the largest portion of services-health insurance, nurs-
ing homes, blood banks, and residences for the mentally impaired."
Thus, there may be an important link between professional incentives
and authority and the role of nonprofit medical facilities. What this rela-
tionship implies normatively has caused considerable debate. Some view
physicians' authority in nonprofit agencies as essentially elitist, reflecting
motives which diverge from other important social values. 9 Others argue
that this authority furthers important social goals: access to care for the
poor, avoidance of low quality care, and the strengthening of a fiduciary
relationship between health institutions and the communities in which
they are located.90
87. Most health insurance plans, for instance, do not cover the costs of "experimental" proce-
dures. It is only when such care is provided on a sufficiently wide spread basis that it is covered and
thus affordable for most individuals.
88. See Table 1 supra.
89. See, e.g., Clark, supra note I1, at 1439.
90. See, e.g., Relman, supra note 2, at 967-68.
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III. The Impact of Organizational Form on the Cost and Quality of
Health Care Services and on Patient Access
To better understand the ways in which competition has led to a con-
vergence in the practices of for-profit and nonprofit facilities, and the ex-
tent to which this has happened, it is useful to review the existing litera-
ture on the comparative performance of contemporary for-profit and
nonprofit health care institutions. This review of the literature will also
clarify the interaction of professional incentives and ownership. American
health policy has concentrated on three primary aims: promoting access to
care, limiting the cost of treatment, and assuring the provision of services
of adequate quality. 1 Past studies of the effects of ownership on the
behavior of providers have understandably focused on these same three
areas.
A. Cost of Services
Over a dozen studies have compared average costs of care in nonprofit
and for-profit nursing homes. Using varying sources of data and measures
of costs, these studies have reached a common conclusion-controlling for
characteristics of patients, range of services provided, and other attributes
of the facility, for-profit homes have average costs five to fifteen percent
lower than their nonprofit counterparts."
In contrast, investigations of the hospital industry have found only
small, inconsistent differences in reported costs of proprietary and non-
profit facilities. Cost per day is generally higher in for-profit facilities, but
shorter lengths of stay have led to their relative cost per admission being
measured as lower in some studies, higher in others, and roughly equal in
the rest."8
91. See supra note 77.
92. Ten of the studies are reviewed and summarized in Bishop, Nursing Home Cost Studies and
Reimbursement Issues, 2 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 47, 52 (1980). Since that review was published,
additional research has been completed. See M. KOETTING, NURSING HOME ORGANIZATION AND
EFFICIENCY (1980); Frech & Ginsburg, The Cost of Nursing Home Care in the United States: Gov-
ernment Financing, Ownership, and Efficiency in HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND HEALTH ECONOMICS
67-81 U. Van Der Gaag & M. Perlman eds. 1981); Caswell & Cleverley, Cost Analysis of the Ohio
Nursing Home Industry, 18 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 359 (1983); Schlenker & Shaughnessy,
Case Mix, Quality and Cost Relationships in Colorado Nursing Homes, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.
61 (1984).
93. See Bays, Cost Comparisons of For-Profit and Non-Profit Hospitals, 13C SOC. Sci. MED.
219 (1979) (concluding "[F]orprofits in general are no less costly than nonprofits, but that chain
forprofits are significantly less costly than are other types of hospitals"); Lewin, Derzon & Margulies,
Investor-Owneds and Nonprofits Differ in Economic Performance, HOSPITALS, July 1, 1981, at 52
(finding higher revenues per day and per stay but only slightly higher costs for investor owned hospi-
tals as compared to not-for-profit, non-chain, community hospitals); Sloan & Becker, supra note 80,
at 660 (finding that the overall savings in payments to hospitals is in the form of reduced profits, not
reduced costs); Sloan & Vraciu, Investor-Owned and Not-for-Profit Hospitals: Addressing Some
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This research indicates that there are ownership-related differences in
costs in facilities such as nursing homes where physicians' roles are rela-
tively attenuated,94 but no difference in facilities such as hospitals where
there is a stronger professional presence."5 This suggests that professional
standards and incentives mitigate some of the incentives for cost reduction
(either through increased efficiency or reduced quality) which might oth-
erwise be associated with for-profit ownership.
B. Quality of Services
Assessments of ownership-related differences in quality, for the most
part, mirror the findings on the costs of care. For those facilities in which
physicians control the delivery of care, there seem to be few, if any,
measurable differences in quality." For example, a recent review con-
cluded that at least under existing standards, there is no evidence that the
profit motive induces physicians to compromise quality, "[u]nless new def-
initions of quality are proposed which are more rigorous, comprehensible,
measurable, and widely acceptable than those noted above, there appears
to be no basis for examining this dimension beyond the results of existing
studies."'"
On the other hand, where physicians play a less active role, there is, in
fact, evidence suggesting that lower quality care is found in for-profit set-
tings. Whether there are differences in the average quality is a matter of
debate." There is evidence, however, that for-profit facilities are dispro-
portionately represented among institutions offering the very lowest qual-
ity care."'
Issues, 2 HEALTH AFF. 25, 34 (Florida study finding relative community costs of nonteaching not-
for-profit and investor owned hospitals virtually identical and concluding "[Olwnership...is a poor
predictor of a hospital's willingness to treat low-income patients, costs to the community, and
profitability.").
94. M. KOETTING, supra note 92.
95. See Sloan & Becker, supra note 80.
96. See Schlesinger & Dorwart, supra note 82, at 959 (finding no simple correspondence between
the form of ownership and quality of care, but rather, that effects of ownership vary with the types of
services being provided); Schlesinger, The Rise of Proprietary Health Care, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan.-
Feb. 1985, at 7, 11 ("where physicians play a more active role, the incentives produced by the profit
motive may be largely mitigated by standards of professional behavior").
97. Sherman & Chilingerian, For Profit vs. Non Profit Hospitals: The Effect of the Profit Motive
on the Management of Operations 4 (December, 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation).
98. Studies comparing for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes have reached a variety of conclu-
sions. See, e.g., M. KOETTING, supra note 92; Holmberg & Anderson, Implications of Ownership for
Nursing Home Care, 6 MED. CARE 300 (1968); Riportella-Mueller & Slesinger, The Relationship of
Ownership and Size to Quality of Care in Wisconsin Nursing Homes, 22 GERONTOLOGIST 429
(1982); S. Ullman, Ownership and Performance in the Long-Term Health Care Industry (Dept. of
Economics Working Paper, University of Miami, January, 1983).
99. See D. SMITH, LONG-TERM CARE IN TRANSITION: THE REGULATION OF NURSING HOMES
86 (1981); B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 123.
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C. Ownership and Access to Medical Care
Throughout their history for-profit institutions have labored under the
suspicion that they treat only the more profitable patients. In 1970 it was
noted that "the most serious indictment of proprietary hospitals is con-
tained in the argument that has been labeled 'cream-skimming'."100 Six-
teen years later the scale of proprietary operations has enlarged greatly,
but the concerns of observers have not changed. The quest for profits is
regarded as "an additional motive to private provider groups and institu-
tions to engage in patient skimming and to discontinue needed but cost-
ineffective services." 10 1
Private nonprofit institutions, however, are also reported to select
patients carefully. In the mid-1970's, the National Health and Environ-
mental Law Project received a number of reports from local legal services
programs indicating that there was significant channeling of "indigent
patients who present themselves for treatment at private, not-for-profit
hospital emergency rooms to municipal and county hospitals. ' 102 Based on
these and other reports, some analysts have concluded that "cream-
skimming" is a major factor within the voluntary sector as well: "The
suburban community hospitals avoid the poor. . .The voluntary teaching
hospitals prefer if they can to take the 'interesting cases' and send every-
one else to the city or county hospital."', 8
It is clear then that both private nonprofit and commercial health pro-
viders engage in some screening of patients who seek care. If ownership
affects restrictions on access, it will thus be reflected not in the presence,
but in the nature or extent, of patient selection. Facilities may select
among patients to further a variety of organizational objectives, including
increased profits or enhanced status as teaching or research institutions.
We focus here on selection of patients on the basis of profitability, since
this can be most readily measured.
Health care providers can avoid unprofitable patients in three ways.
First, facilities can simply be located away from low-income areas. Sec-
ond, they can choose not to provide services disproportionately used by the
uninsured or under-insured. Third, they can actively screen for and
100. Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 42, at 832. Critics argue that proprietary hospitals
engage in two forms of "cream-skimming": those involving services and those involving patient selec-
tion. According to this view, they skimp on expensive and underutilized services and exclude patients
with complex illnesses who are uninsured or covered by Medicaid and cannot pay their full charges.
101. Nutter, Access to Care and the Evolution of Corporate, For-Profit Medicine, 311 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 917, 918 (1984).
102. Silver, The Legal Accountability of Nonprofit Hospitals, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILI-
TIES CONSTRUCrION 183 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
103. Neuhauser, The Future of Proprietaries in American Health Services, in REGULATING
HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 240 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
Vol. 3: 313, 1986
Nonprofits In Health Care
discourage admission of those unable to pay for care. This screening could
be accomplished by requiring a means test prior to admission or by not
offering sliding fee scales for patients unable to fully cover the costs of
care. Evidence from past studies suggests that for-profit providers are
more likely to use each of these methods, and that this occurs both for
facilities in which physicians play an important role and for those in
which they do not.
1. Screening and the Location of the Facility
To the extent that facilities avoid patients with limited ability to pay,
one would expect them to locate in affluent areas. If for-profit providers
are more sensitive to these incentives, they should provide a higher pro-
portion of services in these areas than in less financially promising locali-
ties. Studies of the location patterns of short-term general hospitals have,
in fact, found that the services provided under proprietary auspices are
more sensitive to changes in demand linked to ability to pay,'" changes in
population levels,105 and extensive insurance coverage.', These patterns
persist whether one focuses on all for-profit hospitals or just those
associated with multi-facility chains.' 07 Studies of proprietary psychiatric
hospitals and home health agencies also demonstrate greater sensitivity to
regional differences in ability to pay on the part of for-profit
institutions.'"
2. Screening and Selection of Services
To screen out patients with limited ability to pay, a facility can be
expected to avoid offering two types of services: (1) those services which
are either not reimbursed or under-reimbursed by insurance plans; and
(2), those services which are used disproportionately by patients who are
uninsured or covered by Medicaid.
104. See Kushman & Nuckton, Further Evidence on the Relative Performance of Proprietary
and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 MED. CARE 189, 202 (1977).
105. Id. The increased demand for care outstrips the ability of nonprofit hospitals to expand and
meet the heightened demand. Therefore, a ready market exists, at least for a short time, for a proprie-
tary hospital. Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 42, at 828.
106. The market share of for-profit hospitals increases for both Medicare and commercial insur-
ance, but Blue Cross has no impact. Bays, Patterns of Hospital Growth, 21 MED. CARE 850, 855
(1983).
107. Mullner & Hadley, Interstate Variations in the Growth of Chain-Owned Proprietary Hos-
pitals, 1973-1982, 21 INQUIRY 144, 149 (1984).
108. The proportion of care provided by proprietary psychiatric hospitals is over three times as
high in those states in which private insurers are required to cover psychiatric inpatient care as in the
states in which there is no such mandate, and proprietary home health agencies are almost three times
as prevalent in states with "generous" Medicaid programs as in states with lower Medicaid payments.
Schlesinger & Blumenthal, supra note 76.
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Surveys of psychiatric hospitals, for example, show that for-profit insti-
tutions are indeed four to five times less likely to offer unreimbursed or
under-reimbursed services than are either their private nonprofit or public
counterparts.' 09
Facilities that select patients according to their ability to pay also can be
expected to avoid those services which are used disproportionately by the
indigent. Low-income patients are likely to be either uninsured or covered
by Medicaid, which in most states pays hospitals at a rate far lower than
reimbursement from other insurers."0 In short-term general hospi-
tals-where data on service mix is most readily available-these patients
disproportionately use outpatient services, substance abuse programs, and
dental care."' Controlling for the size of the institution and characteristics
of the surrounding community, private nonprofit hospitals are signifi-
cantly more likely than for-profit institutions to adopt services used by
indigent patients."' These differences in behavior diminish, however, in
smaller communities where the hospital is the sole provider of such
services." 8
3. Screening and Admissions Policies
Facilities can use admissions policies in at least two ways to select
patients on the basis of ability to pay. On the one hand they can employ
exclusionary policies (requiring a means test) to screen out particular
classes of payers, such as the uninsured or those covered by Medicaid.
Conversely, by providing services at a reduced charge, facilities can en-
courage the patronage of lower-income patients. Facilities that seek more
profitable patients can be expected to adopt the former policies and to
avoid the latter.
Surveys of physicians reveal that investor-owned hospitals are two to
four times as likely to adopt policies to "discourage admissions" of
109. See Schlesinger & Dorwart, supra note 82, at 964. Several types of services are included in
this category. Emergency telephone and suicide prevention services are generally unreimbursed, since
the client is often unidentified and cannot be billed. Home care and day care programs tend, for
historical reasons, to be under-reimbursed by insurers as well. Id. at 963.
110. Thus hospitals use revenues from full paying patients to subsidize the Medicare and Medi-
caid patients. Even for-profit hospitals care for some Medicare/Medicaid patients. The number of
Medicare/Medicaid patients is large enough to possess sufficient market power to force hospitals to
accept a substantial discount on the cost of care. Sloan & Vraciu, supra note 93, at 33.
111. M. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 249-50.
112. See Cromwell & Kanak, The Effects of Prospective Reimbursement Programs on Hospital
Adoption and Service Sharing, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 67, 79-81, 82 (1982) (service adoption
was found to be correlated with various measures of size, regulatory status, and physician composition
of the hospital itself and also was correlated with medical need, ability-to-pay, and the concentration
of providers in the hospital market area); Schlesinger & Blumenthal, supra note 76.
113. Schlesinger & Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 12.
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uninsured or Medicaid patients. 114 In contrast, a survey of long-term care
facilities, including nursing homes, psychiatric hospitals, and institutions
for the mentally handicapped, found that proprietary facilities were one-
third to one-half as likely to offer services at reduced charge as were their
nonprofit counterparts. 1 These findings suggest that investor-owned in-
stitutions are more likely to select patients on the basis of their ability to
pay. For-profit facilities are also more likely to locate in areas with higher
incomes and to avoid offering services used most by indigent patients.
Finally, proprietary providers appear more likely to screen patients on
insurance status and less likely to encourage the patronage of low-income
patients by offering sliding fee scales."'
Like all health care institutions, for-profit facilities respond to prevail-
ing financial incentives. If they differ from nonprofit providers in this
respect, it is because they seem to respond more vigorously to those incen-
tives. The existence of large numbers of inadequately insured or unin-
sured citizens in this country creates incentives for all health care
institutions to screen patients on the basis of ability to pay. For-profit
institutions are more likely to do so, but, as the data presented above re-
veal, private nonprofit facilities also restrict access far more than do public
health care providers.
IV. Implications for Public Policy
The contemporary expansion of investor-owned health facilities has
provoked much controversy, but not many changes in public policy. This
article, accordingly, has concentrated on assessing the controversy and
sorting out the apparently ambiguous relation between ownership and
important health considerations like access, quality, and cost. Reviewing
the historical and contemporary performance of nonprofit and for-profit
health institutions, we have substantiated two claims about ownership and
valued outcomes in medicine. The first is that factors other than form of
ownership explain much of what is significant about the patterns of
American medicine. The second is that when the mediating factors are
held constant, ownership does have a fairly consistent influence on the
delivery of medical care. The behavior encouraged by both for-profit and
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id.
116. All of these findings should be interpreted with caution. First, most of the comparisons
reported above do not control for many of the factors other than ownership that can affect institutional
policies. Second, there is considerable variation in the behavior of health care organizations within any
ownership category. Among investor-owned institutions, there may be many that discriminate less
than the average nonprofit facility. Wise policy-makers will take this variation into account. Third,
before reacting to access restrictions imposed by for-profit providers, policy-makers should understand
the origins of those screening practices.
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nonprofit ownership has, under various circumstances, served public goals.
The entry of for-profit providers has made available services which other-
wise would have been too limited to meet rapidly growing or shifting pat-
terns of utilization. The nonprofit form has provided a medium for inno-
vative delivery of services and has provided, and continues in many
instances to provide, an important source of care for those without the
means (or insurance) to finance care. These findings pose two questions
for policy makers. First, how should policies best be designed to take into
account ownership-related differences in performance? Second, how can
the positive aspects of each form of ownership best be preserved amidst
the ongoing changes in American medicine?
A. Policy Interventions and the Life Cycle of Medical Services
Many past public policies have been designed specifically to change the
mix of nonprofit and for-profit health care providers. Some states have
prohibited, or proposed prohibiting, investor-ownership of health care
facilities. 117 During some administrations, the federal government has
subsidized the expansion of nonprofit facilities.1" During others, however,
the federal government has sought to expand the role of investor owner-
ship in health care.11'
These past policies have had, at best, mixed success. Policies designed to
limit the role of for-profit providers have been circumvented by disguised
profit-taking in ostensibly nonprofit organizations. 20 At other times, these
policies have so restricted the entry of new providers that they have led to
serious shortages in the availability of services.12 1 Conversely, policies
117. Past ownership-based interventions have often been crude and, as a result, have met with
mixed success. For example, when California adopted a pre-paid system of care for its Medi-Cal
enrollees, policy-makers were concerned that pre-payment would create incentives to cut quality of
care. To mitigate these incentives, they required that all participating pre-paid plans be organized
under nonprofit auspices, on the theory that this would prevent providers from having a monetary
incentive to reduce quality. This strategy was circumvented by entrepreneurs who established a set of
nonprofit dummy corporations which effectively funneled profits to subsidiaries, creating essentially
the same incentives as if the plans had been organized as proprietary corporations. See Chavkin &
Treseder, California's Prepaid Health Plan Program: Can the Patient Be Saved?, 28 HASTINGS L.
J. 685 (1977) (reviewing the development of the prepaid health plan program in California). See also
McNeil & Schenkler, HMOs, Competition and Government, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 195
(1975) (examining the impact of laws prohibiting for-profit HMOs on the spread of HMOs gener-
ally); NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECONOMY, RE-
PORT ON NURSING HOMES AND HEALTH RELATED FACILITIES 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEW
YORK STATE COMMISSION] (proposing policies to "gradually phase out proprietary nursing facilities
in New York and to substitute voluntary nonprofit institutions.").
118. See Clark, supra note 11 (discussing the array of preferential policies subsidizing
nonprofits).
119. See B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 44.
120. See, e.g., Etzioni & Doty, Profit in Not-for-Profit Corporations: The Example of Health
Care, 91 POL. Sci. Q. 433-53 (1976). See supra note 117.
121. See B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 250.
Vol. 3: 313, 1986
Nonprofits In Health Care
which have encouraged the spread of for-profit agencies have been criti-
cized as government promotion of "profiteering" at the expense of decent
quality medical care."3 2
As a result of these apparent failings, the use of preferential subsidies
and, more generally, ownership-based interventions has to some extent
fallen out of favor in the 1980's. Yet our view is that the past interven-
tions failed not because they were fundamentally ill-conceived but because
they were inappropriately timed. The appropriate response is not to aban-
don ownership-related interventions but to take the development cycle of a
service into account in their design and application.
In the initial stages of the development of a service, treatment is offered
almost exclusively in nonprofit settings. Ownership-related policies are
thus largely irrelevant, and, if adopted, will do little to affect the delivery
of health care. In the middle stages of the life of a service, demand typi-
cally exceeds the expansion capacity of nonprofits. To prohibit or limit the
entry of proprietary organizations at this stage would therefore seriously
restrict the total availability of treatment, perhaps doing more to inhibit
than to enhance access. Under these circumstances, policies that target
additional incentives to for-profit facilities would seem the preferred
approach."'
In the later stages of the evolution of a service, the aggregate level of
demand for treatment stabilizes and competition among providers
increases. At this stage, the ability of investor-owned organizations to at-
tract capital more rapidly than nonprofits becomes important in promot-
ing access to care. The increased competition with proprietary facilities,
moreover, forces their nonprofit counterparts to restrict access. Under
these conditions, policies designed to limit entry or expansion of proprie-
tary facilities, while encouraging nonprofit agencies, may be preferable.'
122. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION, supra note 117, at 7 ("The ultimate cause of the
failure of the nursing home industry to provide proper care is the fact that the industry is dominated
by profiteers who seek to generate only profit, not proper care.").
123. For this purpose, the greater responsiveness of for-profit providers to financial incentives can
be an asset as well as a liability. From the mid-1950's through the mid-1970's, many policy initiatives
sought to encourage the expansion of the health care system. As the history of Medicare's end-stage
renal disease (ESRD) program illustrates, the investor-owned sector responded much more readily
than its non-profit counterparts. B. VLADECK, supra note 37, at 250. The 1972 ESRD amendments
to the Social Security Act were intended to assure unrestricted access to care for all those with renal
failure. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, § 2991 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 426(d)-(g)). The for-profit sector reacted more rapidly to the economic opportunity cre-
ated by this new entitlement, opening facilities in many communities that were disproportionately
poor or populated by minorities-areas in which nonprofit providers had been unable or unwilling to
operate. See Lowrie & Hampers, Proprietary Dialysis and the End-Stage Renal Disease Program,
DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANT, Mar. 11, 1982, at 191-204. See generally, Plough, Salem, Shwartz,
Weller & Ferguson, Case Mix in End-Stage Renal Disease, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1432 (1984)
(comparing case mix of hospital-based and free-standing facilities).
124. For a more complete discussion of adapting policy to this life-cycle, see Schlesinger, Marmor
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B. Preserving the Nonprofit Ethos in a Price-Competitive Health
Care World
Many factors other than organizational form have dominated and con-
tinue to dominate the structure of American medicine. Factors shaping the
modern health care industry-who pays for health care and how, the
organizational characteristics of payers and providers, the number and
distribution of physicians and nurses within a given health care field, and
the larger political and economic environment-all dwarf the changes in
corporate form.
American medicine continues to be in considerable difficulty. Access to
adequate care remains a serious problem."" Although figures vary consid-
erably, one study suggests that about 35 million people or fifteen percent
of the population are not covered by a health insurance plan. 6 The costs
of care have inflated enormously over the past decade and a half, rising
from approximately $75 billion, or 7.6% of GNP, in 1970 to more than
$387 billion, or 10.6% of GNP, in 1984,.. without commensurate
improvements in quality or utilization. There is also widespread concern
that rising insurance costs and the associated pressure for cost reduction
further threaten the quality of care available to Americans.1
28
If one imagines removing all the recent developments in organizational
form-the growth of chains and for-profit hospitals-the above critique
would remain substantially intact. The continuing problems with access
and costs point to the presence of fundamental, long-standing features of
American medicine that only partially manifest themselves in the over-
heated debate about the proper legal form of organization. The main chal-
lenge for public policy is to address these fundamental problems facing
health care. Ownership based policies alone will not solve these problems.
An understanding of the historical role of commercialism and profession-
alism-traditionally associated with for-profit and nonprofit organizations
respectively-can, however, aid policy-makers in their efforts to improve
the cost and quality in and access to health care services.
& Smithey, Nonprofit and For-Profit Medical Care: Shifting Roles and Implications for Health
Policy, J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation.)
125. This is true despite the past growth of private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid.
126. Munnell, Ensuring Entitlement to Health Care Services, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 61
(1986).
127. J. Reuter, Health Care Expenditures and Prices 2 (1985) (Congressional Research Service
Major Issues Systems Brief).
128. See ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., HEALTH CARE IN THE 1990s: TRENDS AND STRATEGIES 4
(1984).
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1. Understanding the Shift in the Character of American Medicine
To understand the problems facing the health care industry today, it is
important to be clear about the dramatic changes that have occurred in the
industry over the past decade. We have witnessed a massive shift in the
character of American medicine, not merely a shift in the dominant form.
The growth of the for-profit chains, the competitive challenges to
business-as-usual, and the consequent shifts in the behavior of nonprofits
are missed if one concentrates on nonprofit market share alone. The infu-
sion of new capital in medicine has promoted competitive behavior in the
industry, further exacerbating and obscuring the very conditions that
should be the central subject of debate, namely, cost, access, and quality of
care. Whatever the history of the nonprofit in American medicine, the
evidence of its performance, relatively speaking, supports neither side of
the nonprofit or for-profit debate. Both the for-profit and nonprofit health
care providers have been affected by the growing commercialism of the
health care industry and the associated decline of physician autonomy over
health care decisions.
It is important to avoid a misleading characterization of the changes in
American medical care. Legal forms are often held to stand for other insti-
tutional features associated with, but not identical to, the nonprofit, profit,
or governmental structure of ownership. What commentators have inaccu-
rately labelled as the rise of profit-making firms in health in fact stands
for a number of separate developments. It represents, in part, medical
capitalism in the form of large-scale corporate investment in medicine, as
with HCA and AHS. 2 It stands as well for a spirit of entrepreneurial-
ism-to use one of the vulgarities-that denotes a newer orientation to-
ward profit, innovation, marketing sensitivity and the like.130 Finally, it
stands for the scale and geographic reach of new hospital units-religious,
profit-making, or nonprofit-that range over many sites (chains) and may,
as with HCA, vertically integrate with drug suppliers, insurance firms, or
hospital product firms.
The growing commercialism of American medicine has had a major
impact on the role of the physician in health care. New entrepreneurs and
professional managers are taking profits out of medical care, and doctors
are losing control to these new decision makers. The problem is most no-
ticeable in for-profit organizations, but nonprofit organizations have also
been affected. Where competitive pressures are great, the behavior of
129. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 5.
130. See The New Entrepreneurialism in Health Care: 1984 Annual Health Conference, The
New York Academy of Medicine, 61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1 (1985) (examining the "entry of
major corporate for-profit enterprise in the direct provision of personal health services").
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for-profit and nonprofit institutions often converges.1"1 Given that doctors
and other medical personnel have been making the functional equivalent
of profits under the old regime, it is unclear whether total profits and costs
will increase under the new regime.1"" Who will benefit, however, and
who will be accountable to whom, will certainly change. Small entrepre-
neurs-particularly physicians-seem to be losing power to larger organ-
ized corporate institutions, ones exemplified by Humana and Hospital
Corporation of America and, in part, by the new nonprofit systems. Some
of the changes now occuring, particularly the vertical and horizontal inte-
gration of medical care facilities, are historically unprecedented in health.
They can, however, be understood as a familiar stage in the development
of Western capitalism, the displacement of smaller units by larger ones in
the name of rationalization.1 89
The health care debate, therefore, should not be solely over profits or
profit-making. It must concern the control of patients, profits, and profes-
sional privilege. The argument is not so much about organizational forms
as it is about the incremental decline of a service ethos-more naked in
one sector, more camouflaged in the other. The culture of American
medicine, already entrepreneurial and commercial by international com-
parison, will probably grow more So.
1 84
All one needs to add here are the memorable words of the executive
director of American Medical International's St. Jude Hospital in New
Orleans, whose comments are typical of the view that medicine is nothing
but an ordinary market service. In explaining why hospitals are justified
in getting tough with patients who cannot pay for care, Mr. John
131. To summarize our conclusions, there do not seem to be appreciable differences for most
American patients in the care provided by for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. We are not saying no
differences exist-indeed we document them-but we want rather to emphasize that the near-term
effects of the loss of market share by nonprofit hospitals do not correspond to the dire predictions of
the critics.
If one shifts the question slightly, however, our interpretation changes substantially. We do see
significant differences in the forms of ownership and management for medical care entrepreneurs, who
want to take profits out of medical care in the form of stock ownership (and are big winners), and for
doctors, who have been profit makers all along but are losing control to new profit-takers.
132. Surely the potential for profit growth exists. As Evans notes about the for-profit testing lab,
"[Tihe strong stimulus to 'more' which is a consequence of for-profit motivation justifies serious con-
cern. Unnecessary testing is pure waste of resources. But for-profit organization does not, cannot,
recognize unnecessary testing as an intellectual concept. Sales are their own justification." R. EVANS,
supra note 3, at 231.
133. As Morone has observed, "[flor-profit chains scramble the traditional discourse over Ameri-
can health policy by pitting the principle of free enterprise against that of physician autonomy.",
Actually this tension has long been present in American health care, but it took large and powerful
corporations to take up the profession's ideology with a vengeance. Morone, The Unruly Rise of
Medical Capitalism, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 28-29 (1985).
134. For a discussion of the difficulties of comparison between the British and American health
care systems see Marmor & Klein, Cost vs. Care: America's Health Care Dilemma Wrongly Consid-
ered , HEALTH MATRIX (Vol. 4, 1986 forthcoming).
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McDaniel noted that "[g]rocery stores don't have to provide food to the
indigent."18 This casual remark is terribly revealing in its acceptance of
this business-like aspect of health care. This acceptance reflects a guiltless
dismissal of centuries of concern that the care of the sick imposes special
obligations on both the givers of care and the community as a whole. Of
equal concern is the behavior of the nonprofit institutions that carefully
nurture reputations for community service while, at the same time, trans-
ferring costly cases to the local county hospitals. The relative triumph of
commercialism and the long decline of professional authority mark a ma-
jor shift in the character of American medicine, not particular forms
within it.
2. Preserving the Best of Commercialism and Professionalism
The central place of nonprofits in American medicine had been, for
some fifty years, largely unchallenged. The community hospi-
tal-nonprofit in form, local in roots, often religious in character, which
permitted physicians to use its capital as they brought in patients-was
ubiquitous, an American institution that by the 1950's had the quality of
the familiar, the taken-for-granted. As the problem of medical inflation
became epidemic in the late 1960's and 1970's, that form, along with
much else in American medicine, was increasingly criticized, challenged,
and sometimes even ridiculed.
The typical challenge was to point out the gap between the mission of
the nonprofit and its reality, the ever-increasing revenues it bargained for
with insurance companies, governments, and patients with a zeal often
associated with capitalist enterprise. For much of the post-war period, this
critique was associated with the alternative of government regulation and,
for some, with the dream of national health insurance. But by the end of
the 1970's, a wholly different alternative had emerged from this quite
common diagnosis. It was that competition-first from health maintenance
organizations, and then from the chains of profit-making hospi-
tals-would right the wrongs of medicine. Increased competition, it was
argued, would help us all, and the pressure of profit-seeking and the
vaunted efficiencies of that for-profit model of corporate organization were
widely touted. 86 This most recent change in the debate set the context for
our discussion of the role of nonprofits in medicine.
The vices of the for-profits do not exonerate the nonprofits, although
one could hardly tell from the high-minded preachiness of some in the
135. See Grady, The Cruel Price of Cutting Medical Expenses, DISCOVER, May, 1986, at 25, 40.
136. See generally Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1981) (analysis of procompetitive reform alternatives).
Yale Journal on Regulation
nonprofit health world. Nor does the inflationary history of the nonprofit
health institutions of the past two decades make the proprietary institu-
tions necessarily an answer to the costliness of American medicine. There
are limits to what can be said by distinguishing between organizational
forms; the differences, while there, are simply not that great. There
should be few limits, however, to the vigilance with which we examine the
behavior of health institutions and apply the appropriate constraints to the
vices of their organizational virtues. There may be some areas where the
innovative, energetic pursuit of profit will, under the right rules, bring
social gain. Drug production and laboratory medicine now operate under
such rules, with ambiguous results.1"" More competition between provid-
ers will almost certainly bring increased sensitivity to patients (particu-
larly well-insured ones) and the costs of their care. Whether that sensitiv-
ity will mean caring or coddling is uncertain. Whether the concern about
costs will produce true efficiency gains is uncertain but possible." 8
There are parallel considerations for the nonprofits in health. Will the
patient screening that is now profitably practiced by hospital administra-
tors be rejected by physicians and nurses who might be concerned with
providing care for the needy? Will the nonprofit rationale-the commit-
ment to caring for the sick, however financed-re-enter our debates in a
way such that responsible action is fiscally rewarded or, at the very least,
not penalized? Will physicians discover anew the advantages of the non-
profit form without our policy makers losing the distinction between pro-
fessional autonomy that helps patients and fiscal independence that simply
augments the incomes of physicians? 3 9 Will we, in short, recognize that
health care has been, for very good reasons, a not-only-for-profit industry
and that no amount of marketing .hype will make vulnerable patients the
wary consumers of Adam Smith's theoretical markets?
The challenge for public policy will be to discover rules of the medical
game that constrain the vices of both rampant commercialism and compla-
cent professionalism. The real uncertainty is whether our polity is capable
of such sophistication.
3. The Special Problem of Caring for the Poor
Policy-makers should recognize that the screening practices of for-profit
health care facilities, and to a lesser extent those of nonprofit facilities,
137. See R. EVANS, supra note 3, at 209-31.
138. See id. at 225-26. (arguihg that competition could promote more efficient production and
distribution but creates inefficiencies in drug prescription and utilization patterns).
139. See generally Majone, Professionalism and Nonprofit Organizations, 8 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 639 (1984) (discussing why professionals prefer to work in nonprofit rather than for-
profit or bureaucratic settings).
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result in no small measure from overt public policy decisions and from the
failure of American government to alleviate some major social problems.
The growth of proprietary health care institutions highlights the lack of
consensus about, or clear policy toward, what constitutes adequate access
to health care for our citizens. Nor is there any agreement on the respon-
sibility of health care providers either to individuals seeking care or to the
community in which providers are located. 40
Over time, the rise of proprietary institutions, and practices inspired by
them, will lead to further discimination against unprofitable patients.141
As access to care becomes more problematic, policy-makers may feel com-
pelled to consider broad public insurance programs that will guarantee
adequate coverage and payment for all Americans. It would be perhaps a
fitting irony if the spread of for-profit medicine created conditions that
prompted massive new governmental interventions into the organization
and financing of health care services. It would be a further irony if private
nonprofit institutions, in responding to the competitive challenge of
140. Generally, both public and private hospitals have a duty to accept all patients who require
emergency care. See, e.g.,Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961)
(private hospital must provide emergency services to critically ill infant); Guerrero v. Copper Queen
Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329 (1983) (duty to treat in emergency situations). See generally Recent Develop-
ments-Private Hospital Must Admit Unmistakable Emergency Cases, 14 STAN. L. REv. 910
(1962); Marsh, Health Care Cost Containment and the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 157 (1985);
Annot. 35 A.L.R. 3d 841 (1971 & Supp. 1985) ("Liability of Hospital for Refusal to Admit or Treat
Patient"). That duty, however, does not extend to the non-emergency situations, where the private
hospital has no such obligation. See Baltimore Co. Hosp. Inc. v. Maryland Hosp. Serv. Inc., 234 Md.
427, 200 A.2d 39, 41 (1964) ("A private hospital is not under a common law duty to serve everyone
who applies for treatment. . .In the absence of statute, it may accept some applicants and reject
others."). But see Marsh, supra, at 162 (suggesting that some confusion surrounds the question of the
difference between duty to treat an emergency room patient and the obligation to admit that same
patient for further treatment).
141. Under the new prospective payment systems such as Medicare's DRGs, all hospitals have
the clear incentive to "specialize" in the care of low-cost, uncomplicated patients. Screening on the
basis of cost will almost certainly increase in all types of facilities. Here too, however, investor-owned
facilities seem likely to respond to these economic incentives more vigorously than will other providers.
In addition, the increased sensitivity of for-profit, and even nonprofit institutions, to the economics
of health care services may threaten the viability of government-owned health care facilities. See gen-
erally Brown, supra note 77 (defining the differences among public community hospitals, and exam-
ining the problems faced by those that serve primarily the poor); Lewin & Lewin, Health Care for
the Uninsured, Bus. & HEALTH, Sept. 1984, at 9 (public and private sector options for paying for the
health care of the poor). In the hospital sector, for example, private providers will find it profitable to
avoid costly patients within any particular DRG category. The propensity of for-profit facilities to
locate in areas where relatively few unprofitable patients live and to screen such patients further
through selective provision of services and exclusionary admissions policies will, at a minimum, in-
crease the channelling of those patients to government-operated facilities. Brown, supra; Feder,
Hadley & Mullner, supra note 61, at 544-66. For any particular DRG, costs in public institutions
will grow over time, creating the impression that they are becoming less and less efficient relative to
the private sector. This will undoubtedly lead to pressures to close more public hospitals, further
exacerbating restrictions on access. Local, state, and federal governments must act to protect the finan-
cial stability of these facilities which, in many areas, insure a minimum level of access to health care.
To the extent that public institutions are unable to meet new demands placed on them, some illness
will go untreated.
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proprietary chains, helped create these very same conditions on a scale
much larger than the proprietary sector alone could produce.
Conclusion
The adjustment of health policy to shifts in ownership is not new. Past
interventions, however, have typically developed on an ad hoc basis with-
out adequate assessment of their influence on the delivery of services. " 2
We believe that this review of both the history and contemporary per-
formance of nonprofit and for-profit health care facilities provides a basis
for a more reasonable set of health policies.
Exorcising one form of ownership would neither eliminate nor render
catastrophically large existing policy problems, such as ensuring the avail-
ability of health services at reasonable cost and quality." While shifts in
ownership are clearly neither the source of nor the solution to current
failings of American medical care, the observed differences between non-
profit and for-profit performance are nonetheless relevant to health policy.
When health care costs $400 billion annually, the possibility of cutting
costs by even ten percent through shifting services to the most efficient
providers seems quite attractive. In a system in which a large portion of
consumers remain abysmally uninformed about their options for treatment
and the quality of the care they receive, however, the threat of cutting
quality in the pursuit of providers' self-interest is a real and important
concern.
The contemporary growth of investor-owned health care facilities has
been viewed by proponents as the elixir for all that ails American
medicine. Opponents see it as indicative of the virtual abandonment of a
set of cherished social institutions and values. Both sides view the recent
growth of the for-profit sector as foreshadowing a system-wide transfor-
mation, and perhaps complete conversion to proprietary auspices, of the
health industry. In fact, it seems quite unlikely that such radical changes
will occur. As we have seen, there have historically been a number of
pronounced shifts in the relative importance of nonprofit and for-profit
health care providers. These will continue to occur in the future, in
response to changes in private wants, public subsidies, the changing au-
thority of medical professionals, and the introduction of new technologies
and services.
Policy-makers should shift their attention from an undue preoccupation
with organizational form to take into account the massive changes in the
142. M. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 350-74.
143. To use these differences to further social ends, however, requires a fairly sophisticated and
complicated set of policies. See supra note 117.
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character of American medicine. The rise of commercialism and the
decline of the professional ethos are developments that cut across organi-
zational forms and raise fundamental questions about the relative impor-
tance of cost, quality and access in American medicine which health care
policy must address.

